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Introduction
The economic analysis of rank-order tournaments presents itself today as a tremendously successful research area that has experienced a steady increase in interest since its very beginnings.
1 On the theoretical front, it has often been crucial to characterize the optimal tournament (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983; Akerlof and Holden, 2012) . This task has most commonly been accomplished using the so-called …rst-order approach,
i.e., by replacing a continuum of incentive compatibility conditions in the …rm's design problem with a single marginal condition. However, the …rst-order approach is not generally valid, and as a consequence, the properties of the optimal tournament have sometimes been discussed under somewhat restrictive or even indistinct conditions.
The main result of this paper is that the …rst-order approach to tournament design is not innocuous. Speci…cally, it is found that traditional conclusions regarding the e¢ ciency of rank-order tournaments are not universally valid and sometimes too optimistic. In fact, tournaments may be substantially less e¢ cient than suggested by the existing literature.
3 Further, with additional structure imposed on the cost and utility functions, the optimal tournament may be characterized in explicit terms even if the …rst-order approach is invalid. The paper also considers an extension to tournaments with many contestants and a single winner, which may be seen as an equilibrium analysis complementing prior work.
The observation that the …rst-order approach is not generally valid in a moral hazard setting is due to Mirrlees (1975) . Subsequent research on the …rst-order approach may be roughly divided into two strands. A …rst strand of literature is concerned with formulating su¢ cient conditions for the …rst-order approach (Rogerson, 1985; Jewitt, 1988; Sinclair-Desgagné, 1994; Conlon, 2009; Ke, 2013; Kirkegaard 2014a) . A second strand of literature has aimed at eliminating restrictive assumptions from the standard model of moral hazard (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Mirrlees, 1986; Araujo and Moreira, 2001; Ke, 2012; Kadan and Swinkels, 2013; Kirkegaard 2014b; Renner and Schmedders, 2015) . The present paper di¤erentiates itself from these contributions already by its focus on rank-order tournaments. However, also the approach is di¤erent. For example, the present paper does not employ a Lagrangian function. Some implications of this point will be discussed in the conclusion.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-up, and discusses existence. The envelope approach is developed in Section 3. A characterization of the optimal tournament is presented in Section 4, and discussed in Section 5. An extension with more than two contestants is o¤ered in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. All proofs have been relegated to an Appendix.
Set-up and existence
Consider a market environment in which risk-neutral …rms hire workers to produce output of per-unit value V > 0. Given a wage W and an e¤ort level 0, a worker's utility is de…ned as U (W ) C( ), where U is twice di¤erentiable with U 0 > 0, U 00 0, and C is four times di¤erentiable with
is the sum of his e¤ort j and a random component " j ,
i.e., q j = j + " j . It will be assumed that the distribution function G of the di¤erential error term " 2 " 1 is symmetric with respect to the origin and allows a twice di¤erentiable density g = G 0 > 0 such that g 0 and g 00 are bounded. Given a pair of prizes (W 1 ; W 2 ) with W 1 W 2 , worker j's expected 4 The additively separable form of the utility function ensures tractability (cf. Green and Stokey, 1983; Krishna and Morgan, 1998; Akerlof and Holden, 2012) . As discussed in McLaughlin (1988) , alternative speci…cations of the worker's utility function tend to produce similar conclusions under the …rst-order approach. It is conjectured that the same is true for the additional settings considered in the present paper.
utility from playing j against k , with k 6 = j, is then given as
In the usual dual formulation, …rms choose prizes and an e¤ort level so as to maximize a worker's expected utility subject to zero-pro…t and incentive compatibility conditions:
s.t.
Problem (2-4) will be called the unrelaxed problem. A solution (W 1 ; W 2 ; ) to the unrelaxed problem will be referred to (somewhat loosely) as an optimal tournament associated with G.
Under the …rst-order approach (FOA), the continuum of incentive compatibility conditions in (4) is replaced by the single marginal condition
Condition (5) is necessary for any solution of the unrelaxed problem. 5 We will refer to the maximization problem (2), subject to constraints (3) and (5), as the relaxed problem.
5 This is obvious if the optimum e¤ort choice is interior, i.e., if > 0. If, however, = 0, then the Inada conditions imposed on the cost function imply that W 1 = W 2 , so that (5) is satis…ed also in that case.
The relaxed problem is known to allow a solution (W
that can be approximated by replacing utility and cost functions with their respective second-order Taylor expansions. For example, the e¤ort level and the prize spread may be approximated by
and
respectively, where s = U 00 =U 0 denotes the worker's Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, and marginal utility is normalized to unity at mean income. 6 Moreover, if the worker's expected utility function ; FOA ) will not be 6 The speci…c expressions in (6) and (7) are taken from McLaughlin (1988, p. 231 ). These expressions are most accurate when g(0) is large, so that the second-order Taylor approximations are accurate, and when s is small, so that the normalization of marginal utility matters least. When these conditions are not satis…ed, however, it is preferable to solve the relaxed problem numerically, as done below.
7 Indeed, FOA may fail to be a global maximum of U FOA even if the second-order condition holds strictly at FOA (as it does under the present assumptions), and even if a deviation to a zero e¤ort level is unpro…table for the worker. a solution of the unrelaxed problem, which illustrates the limits of the …rst-order approach. In the present paper, a somewhat generous stance will be taken by calling the …rst-order approach invalid only if, for every solution of the relaxed problem, there is at least one incentive compatibility condition in (4) that fails to hold true. As pointed out by Green and Stokey (1983) , the potential non-existence of a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a tournament with arbitrary prizes does not impair the …rm's ability to design the contract (W 1 ; W 2 ; ) in such a way that is a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the tournament with prizes (W 1 ; W 2 ).
9 In fact, as shown in the Appendix, this design problem can always be solved in an optimal way. Proposition 1. An optimal tournament exists (i.e., even if the …rst-order approach is invalid).
The proposition raises the question of how the optimal tournament looks like in settings not traditionally considered. This question is addressed in the following sections. FOA ) of the relaxed problem satis…es all the incentive compatibility conditions in (4). It will be noted that the de…nition for validity used in the present paper is slightly less demanding than the one employed by Rogerson (1985 Rogerson ( , p. 1363 , who required for validity that any solution of the relaxed problem should satisfy incentive compatibility. However, the two de…nitions coincide when the relaxed problem has a unique solution, such as in the risk-neutral case or in the cases considered in Sections 4 and 5.
9 See Green and Stokey (1983, fn. 3): "For arbitrary prize structures, there may be no Nash equilibrium, symmetric or otherwise. This is of no importance to us, since we are considering only tournaments that are designed so that they do have a symmetric Nash equilibrium (emphasis in the original)."
10 The restriction to tournaments that allow a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is de…nitely a choice we made. Alternatively, one could have assumed that …rms may choose to implement mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, the literature o¤ers little guidance with regard to this point. For example, while Green and Stokey (1983) 3 Side-stepping the …rst-order approach This section describes the envelope approach to rank-order tournaments that has been outlined in the Introduction. Note …rst that one may add the equality constraint
to the unrelaxed problem (2-4) without a¤ecting the solution. Provided that (9) holds, however, incentive compatibility (4) becomes equivalent to
Consider now the "upper envelope"of the individual constraints in (10), i.e.,
where the maximum is attained as a consequence of the Inada conditions.
The unrelaxed problem (2-4) may then be reformulated as
where U ( ) denotes the value of the …rm's objective function (2) under the condition that the prize structure (W 1 ; W 2 ) is de…ned implicitly through (3) and (5). 11 The reformulated problem (12-13) is still not standard, because '
consider only pure-strategy equilibria, Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) …nd it more natural to allow for randomization. This point will be taken up again in the conclusion. 11 It is not hard to check that U ( ) is well-de…ned for any 0. Indeed, using (3) to eliminate W 2 in (5), one obtains
Di¤erentiating the left-hand side with respect to W 1 , and noting that U 0 > 0, shows that there is at most one solution. Further, since U 00 0, the left-hand side approaches 1 as W 1 ! 1. By continuity, there is a unique solution. may have kinks. However, using the tools provided by Milgrom and Segal (2002) , it can be shown that ' is monotone increasing if marginal costs are logconcave.
12 Moreover, since '(0) = 0, monotonicity implies that the feasible set in the reformulated problem (12-13) is a closed interval whose left endpoint is zero. Hence, the following result is obtained.
Proposition 2. Assume that C 0 is logconcave, and that the …rst-order approach is invalid. Then < FOA for any pair of respective solutions of the unrelaxed and the relaxed problems.
Proposition 2 shows that the …rst-order approach to tournament design is not innocuous, in the sense that it has the potential to cause a bias in the level of e¤ort considered to be implementable. 
is monotone increasing, then the 12 Being a rather mild assumption, logconcavity of marginal costs has been imposed in prior work (e.g., Chan et al., 2009; Akerlof and Holden, 2012) , and is consistent with both convex and concave marginal costs. Also, marginal costs cannot be globally logconvex under the Inada conditions imposed. Still, it remains an assumption, of course.
13 Indeed, if FOA were a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the tournament with prizes (W
FOA ) would satisfy incentive compatibility, and hence, would solve the unrelaxed problem, in con ‡ict with our presumption that the …rst-order approach is invalid.
14 Moreover, provided that g is unimodal, FOA < FOA , as intuition suggests.
…rm's only way to reduce the worker's incentive to deviate is it to lower the contractual level of e¤ort relative to FOA .
To understand why an assumption on costs is needed, note that raising has altogether three e¤ects on the envelope constraint (13). First, C( ) increases, which tightens the constraint. Second, U (W 1 ) U (W 2 ) increases, which loosens the constraint. Finally, deviations become less likely to win, which also loosens (13). However, if costs are not excessively convex then the change to the prize structure remains su¢ ciently moderate compared to the di¤erential of the other two e¤ects, tipping the balance in favor of a tightening constraint.
The size of the potential welfare loss captured by Proposition 2 is not negligible. To the contrary, as will become clear below, tournaments may be quite ine¤ective as an incentive device.
4 An explicit characterization
This section presents a complete characterization of the optimal tournament in a standard setting. Speci…cally, it will be assumed that costs are quadratic, i.e., that C( ) = c 2 =2 for some c > 0, and that workers exhibit a constant absolute risk aversion, i.e., that either U (W ) = e sW =s for s > 0 or U (W ) = W . These assumptions are made for tractability and can be relaxed.
Indeed, as discussed below, the main features of the optimal tournament do not depend on these assumptions.
To describe the equilibrium in cases where the …rst-order approach is not 15 To mitigate the welfare loss, …rms might decide to use deliberately inaccurate performance measures (O'Kee¤e et al., 1984) , or to induce mixed-strategy equilibria (Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983, Appendix) . Both options are excluded here, however.
valid, it proves useful to take a comparative statics perspective with respect to the dispersion of the di¤erential error term. Thus, for a given distribution function G and an arbitrary parameter > 0, one de…nes a new distribution function G (z) G(z= ), where a larger corresponds to a more dispersed distribution of the di¤erential error term. E.g., if G is standard normal, then G is normal with mean zero and standard deviation .
It is shown in the Appendix (see Lemma A.2) that, under the present assumptions, the …rm's indirect objective function U U is strongly pseudoconcave in , i.e., that the strict second-order condition for a local maximum holds at any critical point. In particular, there is a unique optimal e¤ort level FOA ( ) in the relaxed problem associated with G . As discussed in Section 2, this solution may be approximated in the case of risk aversion, and explicitly obtained in the case of risk neutrality. The optimal tournament (W 1 ( ); W 2 ( ); ( )) associated with G may now be characterized in terms of FOA ( ) as follows.
Proposition 3. Suppose that costs are quadratic and that workers have CARA utility (which includes the case of risk-neutrality as a limit case).
Then, there is a threshold value > 0 such that, for any > 0, the optimal tournament associated with G is unique and implements the e¤ort level
As the proposition shows, the optimal tournament will be shaped by the envelope constraint (13) once the level of individual-speci…c uncertainty falls below a certain level. In particular, the usual comparative statics result that ( ) the optimal prizes for the relaxed problem associated with G . Using the second-order Taylor expansion of utility as above, the prize spread implementing the optimal e¤ort level can be shown to satisfy
where the approximation is exact for , and fairly precise for close 16 Cf. Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 853) and McLaughlin (1988, fn. 5) . Under the speci…c assumptions of Proposition 3, the monotonicity of FOA follows from Lemma A.3 in the Appendix. to zero and s small. 17 Thus, also the predicted prize spread may be biased under the …rst-order approach. In particular, as gets smaller, the optimal spread diminishes much faster than the …rst-order approach would suggest.
18

Discussion
To clarify what happens for < , consider a worker's expected utility from exerting an e¤ort of in the optimal tournament associated with G , i.e.,
Then, the following observation can be made.
Remark 1. For < , there is a "cheating level" ( ) 6 = ( ) such that
Thus, whenever the envelope constraint matters, the worker's objective function U exhibits, besides its global maximum at ( ), at least one additional global maximum at some ( ) 6 = ( ). To see why this is so, suppose that there is no "cheating level."Then, as intuition suggests, the …rm could marginally raise the contractual e¤ort level above ( ), and still satisfy incentive compatibility. 19 But, by strong pseudoconcavity, the …rm's indirect utility 17 To see this, note that the necessary …rst-order condition (5) implies W 1 W 2 c =U 0 g(0) for the respective solutions of the unrelaxed and the relaxed problems. 18 When the assumptions of Proposition 3 are relaxed, one can still show that ( ) = FOA ( ) for su¢ ciently large and that ( ) ! 0 as ! 0. Thus, even though the homogeneous relationships re ‡ected in (14) and (15) tend to break down for cost functions that do not exhibit a constant elasticity, the characterization result captures, in its essence, a more general fact. 19 Given that the worker's local second-order condition holds strictly at ( ), this point turns out to be an immediate consequence of Berge's Theorem. function is strictly increasing at ( ), leading to a contradiction. Hence, the worker's best-response set indeed consists of at least two elements.
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For a general density g, there may be many "cheating levels," possibly in…nitely many. For g su¢ ciently well-behaved, however, it turns out that there is at most one global maximizer of U other than ( ). We will say that g is strictly bell-shaped if there is an r > 0 such that g 00 (z) ? 0 if jzj ? r.
The following observation can now be made.
Remark 2. Suppose that g is strictly bell-shaped. Then, for any (s),
where is the unique strictly positive solution of the equation
The two remarks above are illustrated by the following two examples.
Example 1. For g standard normal, = 2:2809. Hence, ( ) = 0:1827 and ( ) = 2:4636 , for any . For s = 0, this implies ( ) = minf2:4637 ; V =cg, so that = 0:4059 V =c. For s = 0:5; 1; 2; 3; 10, the relaxed problem was solved numerically over the grid = 0:01; :::; 1:00. On that sample, (s) was found to be strictly declining in s, which is intuitive. 20 The necessity of a "cheating level" may be familiar from Grossman and Hart (1983, Prop. 6) or Mookherjee (1984, Prop. 1) . There, the absence of a utility-equivalent lower level of e¤ort would allow the principal to implement the same level of e¤ort at lower cost. Here, similarly, even though actions are continuous, the absence of a "cheating level"would allow the …rm to implement a higher level of e¤ort.
Example 2. If " 1 and " 2 are uniformly distributed, then follows a triangular distribution (e.g., Bull et al., 1987; Altmann et al., 2012) . The normalized density g(z) = maxf0; minf1 + z; 1 zgg is, however, not strictly bell-shaped, so that Remark 2 does not apply. Still, the conclusion of Proposition 3 holds. For instance, for s = 0, one can check that '( ) ' ( ) = c 2 maxf0; g, so that the optimal tournament associated with G is characterized by ( ) = minf ; V =c) and W 1=2 ( ) = (V c 2
) ( ).
Notably, the envelope constraint (13) may come into play in response to changes in V , c, or s, i.e., even if the information structure does not change.
As discussed in the next section, an increase in the number of contestants may have a similar e¤ect.
Large tournaments
This section considers an extension to tournaments with more than two contestants. Attention will be restricted to the case of a single winner.
Denote by F and f the distribution and density functions associated with an individual error term " (assumed i.i.d. across players). Considering a tournament between n workers, and provided that all opponents of some given player j exert the same e¤ort level , worker j's probability of winning may be represented as
The problem of the …rm is only slightly modi…ed:
The optimal tournament satis…es, in particular, the necessary …rst-order condition for a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium,
where g n = (n 1)
An approximation for the solution of the relaxed problem, FOA n , can be found as before. However, as pointed out by McLaughlin (1988, p. 241) , it is in general very di¢ cult to tell if the …rst-order approach is valid for large n.
To side-step the …rst-order approach, one de…nes again the "upper envelope,"which reads in this case
Then, as above, one can show that if marginal costs are logconcave, then the optimally implemented e¤ort n in the tournament between n workers and the corresponding optimal e¤ort level FOA n in the relaxed problem satisfy n FOA n . Thus, also in tournaments with more than two contestants, the …rst-order approach, if invalid, would tend to overstate implemented e¤ort levels.
Additional conclusions can be obtained by focusing, as Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) do, on the incentive compatibility condition at the speci…c e¤ort level b = 0. In the case of the normal distribution at least, one may then characterize the limit behavior of n as follows.
Proposition 4. Suppose that F is normal. Then, as the number of contestants n increases above all …nite bounds, the optimally implemented e¤ort level n goes to zero.
The result above characterizes the limit behavior of a sequence of optimal tournaments in a setting where it is a priori not clear if the …rst-order approach is applicable. It follows from the proposition that the …rst-order approach is indeed invalid in large tournaments in the case of risk-neutrality.
Even though Proposition 4 holds also under the assumption of risk-aversion, no conclusion is possible about the validity of the …rst-order approach in large tournaments for the case of risk-aversion. However, this fact only supports the usefulness of the envelope approach because it delivers results also in situations where su¢ cient conditions for the …rst-order approach may be di¢ cult to …nd.
Conclusion
It has been shown that the …rst-order approach, if used exclusively, may lead to a positively biased assessment of the e¢ ciency of rank-order tournaments.
In particular, tournaments may not be very suitable as compensation schemes when performance is a relatively good signal of e¤ort. Intuitively, prize spread and performance measurement are complements, forcing …rms to reduce the former when the latter improves. In the settings studied above, the prize structure is so unrewarding that the avoidance of cheating becomes a binding constraint, overruling the usual trade-o¤ between risk and incentives. As a consequence, individual contracts such as piece rates may dominate the optimal tournament even when workers are risk-neutral.
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In a recent survey, Waldman (2013) …nds as one of the testable predictions of tournament theory that the prize is increasing in the number of contestants. The results of the present paper suggest, however, that that prediction might not be robust because with many contestants, the …rst-order approach need not be valid, and the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium may lead to ine¢ cient levels of e¤ort. This observation might even help to explain the negative relationship between the salary gap between CEO and vice president and the number of VPs (O'Reilly et al., 1988) .
Regarding further research, one issue might be the question of whether the theoretical issues discussed in this paper may constitute a practical reason for not using tournaments. For example, Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 848) argue that in the case of risk-neutrality, the tie between individual contracts and tournaments is broken by di¤erential costs of information and measurement.
The present analysis obviously provides an alternative hypothesis. Another interesting issue would be the extension of the present analysis to tournaments with more than a single winner (Krishna and Morgan, 1998; Kalra and Shi, 2001; Budde, 2009; Akerlof and Holden, 2012) or to various types of unbalanced tournaments (e.g., Meyer, 1992; Kono and Yagi, 2008; Imhof and Kräkel, 2015) . Finally, it might be worthwhile to explore whether the comparably simple approach outlined in Section 3 could be applied to other settings in contract theory and mechanism design.
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Lemma A.1. De…ne
where
Proof. Since g is a density with bounded …rst and second derivatives,
exists and is bounded in b , for any 0. It follows that the family f@ ( ; b )=@ g b 0 is equicontinuous at any 0. Using the Mean Value Theorem, as in Milgrom and Segal (2002, p. 587) , f ( ; b )g b 0 is now seen to be equidi¤erentiable at any 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote by X( ) the set of maximizers in problem (11). Using Lemma A.1, it follows from Milgrom and Segal (2002, Th. 1&3) that ' is right-hand di¤erentiable at any 0 with
for any b 2 X( ). 23 Moreover, as a consequence of local and global optimality conditions,
for any b 2 X( ). Suppose > 0. Then, using inequalities (32) and (33) to put a lower bound on (28) shows that
for any b 2 X( ). By assumption, C 00 =C 0 is weakly decreasing. Therefore, for any b ,
Hence, ( ; b ) 0 in this case. Using completely analogous arguments, one
shows that, similarly, ( ; b ) 0 if b > . Thus, ' 0 ( +) 0 for any > 0.
Note also that ' is continuous on R + , as a consequence of Berge's theorem. It follows that ' is monotone increasing (Royden, 1988, Sec. 5) . Hence, noting that '(0) = 0, the feasible set of problem (12-13) proving the …rst assertion. The second assertion is now immediate.
For the following three lemmas, the assumptions of Proposition 3 are imposed.
Lemma A.2. U is strongly pseudoconcave in .
Proof. Total di¤erentiation of equations (3) and (5), and subsequently solving the resulting system of linear equations, yields
where u
Di¤erentiating (40) with respect to , and assuming that @U =@ = 0, one
where u 00 1 U 00 (W 1 ) and u 00 2 U 00 (W 2 ). Hence, using (38-39) and @U =@ = 0 another time, one arrives at
where s = u 00
Hence,
Moreover, combining (43) 
Multiplying the two inequalities (46) and (47), one arrives at
It follows that @ 2 U =@ 2 < 0, which proves the claim.
Lemma A.3. FOA > 0. Moreover, FOA is continuous and, provided s > 0, strictly decreasing in .
Proof. It is shown …rst that FOA > 0. Indeed, for = 0, equations (3) and (5) imply W 1 = W 2 , so that evaluating equation (40) at = 0 yields
Hence, FOA > 0, as claimed. Di¤erentiating now (40) with respect to and exploiting that @U =@ = 0, one obtains
But, from equation (3) and the …rst-order condition
, it is immediate that
Simplifying the right-hand side of (49) using (50), and using that s > 0, one arrives at
Since U is strongly pseudoconcave with respect to , the claim follows.
Proof. From incentive compatibility with respect to a deviation to b = 0,
where the second inequality follows from G 1. Hence, 2 =g(0), and therefore, ( ) ! 0 as ! 0. On the other hand, by Lemma A.3, FOA ( ) does not tend to zero as ! 0. Thus, for > 0 su¢ ciently small, ( ) 6 = FOA ( ), which proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma A.4, there is a e > 0 such that (e ) 6 = FOA (e ). Hence, the envelope constraint must be binding in the reformulated problem associated with G e . Since marginal costs are logconcave, it follows from the proof of Proposition 2 that (e ) is equivalent to
Let > 0. Then, with =e , purely algebraic manipulation exploiting the homogeneity of the cost function shows that
where and b b . Hence, (e ) is equivalent to
Invoking Lemma A.2, it follows that
for any > 0. By Lemma A.3, there is a unique such that
Moreover,
if , and
Proof of Remark 1. Suppose the …rm intends to implement an e¤ort level e . In the resulting tournament, a worker's expected utility from exerting an e¤ort of may be written as
where (e ) = ce =g (0), and U is a function that does not depend on .
Note that
c.
Since g 0 is continuous with g 0 (0) = 0, this implies that there is an open and bounded neighborhood N of ( ) such that (60) is strictly negative for any ( ; e ) 2 N N . In particular, for any e 2 N , the restriction of e U ( je ) to N has a unique maximum at e . Since N is bounded, Inada conditions imply there is some max > 0 such that e U ( je ) < e U (e je ) for any > max and for any e 2 N . By choosing the open set N su¢ ciently small, the compact set M = [0; max ]nN is clearly non-empty. The restriction of U e U ( j ( )) to M therefore assumes its maximum in M, say at some ( ). Incentive compatibility implies U ( ( )) U ( ( )) 0. To provoke a contradiction, suppose that U ( ( )) U ( ( )) < 0. Then, e U ( j ( )) e U ( ( )j ( )) < 0 for any 2 M. By Berge's Theorem, this implies e U ( je ) e U ( ( )je ) < 0 for any 2 M, provided that e is su¢ ciently close to ( ). Hence, such e is incentive compatible. But, by Lemma A.2, U (e ) is strictly increasing in e in a neighborhood of ( ), which is impossible.
Proof of Remark 2. W.l.o.g., let < (the case = follows by continuity), and choose some optimal (W 1 ( ); W 2 ( ); ( )) associated with G . Then, from Remark 1, there is a ( ) such that
where the argument has been dropped to ease notation. From the Inada conditions, > 0. Hence, both and are interior maxima of U ( j; ( )), satisfying
where g (z) = g(z= )= . Adding (62) and (63) up, multiplying the result through with ( )=2, and subsequently subtracting (61), one arrives at
where = . Equation (64) allows at most one strictly positive solution = ( ). To see this, de…ne the function
Then, h 0 (0) = 0, and h 00 ( ) = g 00 ( )=2. Thus, since g is strictly bellshaped, there is indeed at most one solution. Next, note that (64) implies ( ) = (1). Finally, from the …rst-order conditions, g(0)=g( ) = ( )= ( ). Simple algebra leads now to (17).
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the speci…c deviation to b = 0. For any 0, we have
since G n ( ; ) = 1 n . For n to constitute an equilibrium in the tournament between n workers, it is necessary that ' n ( n ) 0. Hence,
Because f 0 (") = "f (")= 2 in the case of the normal distribution, integrating by parts yields
= n
where the asymptotic relationship for the mean extreme of n identically and independently distributed normal variables has been taken from David and Nagaraja (2003, Sec. 10.5) . But, as in the proof of Proposition 1, Jensen's inequality implies
for any n. Hence, n for any n. Since ng n ! 1 for n ! 1, it follows from (68) that, indeed, n ! 0 for n ! 1.
